Facts: The defendants carelessly exposed their employee, a van driver (the claimant), to extreme cold in the course of his duties. The claimant suffered frost bite as a result.

Held: The court held that the defendants had exposed the claimant to severe cold and fatigue likely to cause a common cold, pneumonia, or chilblains. It was held, therefore, that since frostbite was of same type and kind as these harms the defendant could be liable

Facts: A person had one normal thumb and a second superfluous thumb on the same hand. He fractured the superfluous thumb whilst working. It was treated by splinting but the pain continued. He was then sent to hospital where it was discovered that the fracture had not united. He was advised that an operation was required to remove not just the extra thumb but also the joint of the normal thumb. The result of the operation left him with more pain and meant he could only do light work. He applied for compensation on the ground of this incapacity. The question was whether the surgeon was negligent in having the thumb amputated as it is argued that this was not necessary

Held: Whether a chain of causation had been broken was a question of fact. It was “axiomatic” that later negligence by a doctor (so in principle, presumably anyone’s later negligence) would amount to a “new cause” and so break the chain of causation flowing from the original accident. Lord Reid (dissenting) said that a “grave lack of skill or care on the part of the doctor” treating an injury could amount to a novus actus interveniens.

Facts: The claimant (8 year old) and another boy were playing on a road. Near the road was a potthole with red paraffin warning lamps placed there. The boys mucked around and the claimant accidently knocked the lamp into the hole, causing an explosion. The claimant suffered severe burns.

Held: The defendant was held to be liable for negligence of the workmen. The defendant was liable because the damage was not too remote as it was foreseeable that the boys might suffer a burn from the lamp → the fact that the burn resulted from an unforeseeable explosion did not prevent the type of damage being foreseeable

⇒ If the injury was of a different kind than the foreseeable type, then the defendant could have escaped liability.

Facts: As a result of Mr John’s negligent driving his car overturned in a tunnel. Two police officers on motorcycles arrived at the scene. The senior officer instructed them both to ride their motorcycles to the other side of the tunnel and close the entrance to the tunnel as he had forgotten to close it earlier. They took the decision of driving on through the tunnel on the wrong side of the road on a blind bend rather than going the long way around. One of the officers was struck by an oncoming vehicle. The officer argued it was Mr John’s fault because had he not crashed then the officer would not have found himself in the situation he was in

Held: It was held that the senior officer’s instructions and failure to close the entrance to the tunnel was negligent and broke the chain of causation: the claimants decision to go through the tunnel was not negligent and was therefore entitled to full damages from the senior officer

Facts: The Council (the defendant) negligently fractured a water pipe outside D’s house. This caused extensive damage and the property had to be vacated. One year later the council had not undertaken the repairs. Squatters had also moved in and caused further damage. The claimant arranged for repairs to be done herself and submitted a bill to the council for the repairs and damage caused by the squatters

Held: It was held the council was not liable for the acts of the squatters: it was not foreseeable that squatters would move into an empty house in Camden and cause damage despite the prevalence of such behaviour in Camden at the time

Facts: The claimant sustained an injury at work due to his employer’s breach of duty. He strained his back and hips and his leg was prone to giving way. Whilst in this state he attempted to climb down a steep concrete staircase without a handrail unaided. He got part way down and felt his leg give way so he jumped 10 steps to the bottom. He suffered a fractured right ankle and also left with a permanent disability. The defendant accepted liability for the injury sustained during his employment but disputed liability for the second injuries resulting from claimant's actions in jumping down the stairs

Held: It was held that the claimant's actions amounted to a novus actus inteveniens (i.e. an act breaking the chain of causation). SO the defendant was not liable.

Facts: The issue in this case was whether or not the fire was forseeable. The Wagon Mound (a ship) docked in Sydney Harbour in October 1951. The crew negligently allowed furnace oil to leak. Some cotton debris became embroiled in the oil and sparks from some welding works ignited the oil. The fire spread rapidly causing destruction of some boats and the wharf

Held: The court held that Re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co [1921] should no longer be considered good law and said the defendant can only be liable for damage that was reasonably foreseeable. The court held it was too remote for the defendant to be loable for the destruction of the boats and wharf: it was harm of an unforeseeable kind

Facts: The claimant had suffered from Myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME) over a period of time and was in recovery when he was involved in a minor car accident due to the defendant's negligence. The claimant was not physically injured but the incident triggered his ME, meaning he was unable to return to his job as a teacher.

Held: The defendant was held to be liable. Provided that some kind of personal injury was foreseeable it did not matter whether the injury was physical or psychiatric. Also, the fact that an ordinary person would not have suffered the injury incurred by the claimant was irrelevant as the defendant must take his victim as he finds him under the eggshell skull rule

Facts: The claimant purchased a food storage hopper. It was installed negligently which meant the pig feed went mouldy. As a result many pigs caught e-coli and died

Held: It was held that the defendant was liable. The court said that said some form of illness was foreseeable from having mouldy pig food, even if e-coli and death was not foreseeable, so should be held liable (this is very similar to Hughes v Lord Advocate, but compare the case to Tremain v Pike).

Facts: The defendant's employees negligently loaded cargo onto the plaintiff's (claimant's) ship. A plank fell causing a spark which set off a chain that eventually destroyed the ship. The question for the court is what is foreseeable in terms of damage if a plank fell → you would probably expect some damage but not for the entire ship to burn down. The plaintiff sued the defendant for the value of the entire boat. The defendant claimed that the damage was too remote to be foreseeable.

Held: The court of appeal held that the defendant was liable even though the magnitude of the consequences was not foreseeable. This was a harsh judgment and does not stand anymore!

Facts: The defendant employed the claimant who slipped on a ladder at work because of oil on the step. The claimant suddered a minor injury. At hospital he was given an anti-tetanus injection, where he contracted encephalitis due to an allergy of which he was previously unaware.

Held: The hospital was negligent but not liable, since even the proper procedure would not have revealed the allergy. However, the claimant's employers, on the other hand, were legally responsible for the encephalitis as well as for the minor injury: if a wrongdoer ought to foresee that as a result of his wrongful act the victim may require medical treatment then he is liable for the consequences of the treatment applied although he could not reasonably foresee those consequences

Facts: Shepherd (the defendant) chucked a lighted squib into a crowd of people. Willis, a bystander, picked up the squib and chucked it elsewhere to protect himself from injury. The squib landed at someone else’s foot, who then chucked it elsewhere too, before it exploded in Scott’s (the claimant) face, putting out one of his eyes.

Held: It was held that there had been no break in the chain of causation by the action of throwing on the squib elsewhere: the actions were a foreseeable national consequence

Facts: A widow brought a claim against the defendant (who employed her husband) under the Fatal Accidents Act for the death of her husband. As a result of the defendant's negligence the husband had incurred a burn to his lip. His lip contained pre-cancerous cells which were triggered by the injury sustained and he died 3 years later.

Held: The defendant was held to be liable: the burn was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence and this resulted in his death. So the defendant was liable for his death. It was not necessary to show that death by cancer was foreseeable, nor that an ordinary person would not have died from the injury. The eggshell skull rule applies and the defendant must take his victim as he finds him.

Facts: A ship called The Oropesa was negligently navigated and collided with another ship, the Manchester Regiment. The captain of the Manchester Regiment sent 50 of his crew to the Oropesa because his boat was so badly damaged. An hour later he set off with another 16 of crewmembers, to go to the Oropesa, in another lifeboat. The lifeboat capsized in the heavy seas and 9 of the crew drowned. the Manchester Regiment later sank. Relatives of the drowned seamen sued.

Held: The court held that the owners of The Oropesa were liable: the actions of the captain of the other ship did not break the chain of causation because they were reasonable in all the circumstances.

⇒ Unreasonable actions would have broken the chain of causation → so if one of the lifeboat crew had drowned after deciding to swim to the Oropesa then the chain would have been broken and the owners of Oropesa would not have been liable for his death

⇒ ‘To break the chain of causation it must be shown that there is…a new cause which disturbs the sequence of events, something which can be described as either unreasonable or extraneous or extrinsic.’ (Lord Wright at 39)

Facts: The claimant, a herdsman, contracted rare Weil's disease while working for the defendant.

Held: The court held that Weil's disease was not forseeable although other diseases from rats were foreseeable. So he defendants were not liable. This case has been doubted as it appears to be inconsistent with Bradford v Robinson Rentals [1967], but it has not been overruled